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CHALLENGES TO THE DOCTRINE
OF FREE TRADE*
JAGDISH

N.

BHAGWATI**

The doctrine of free trade is facing new challenges today. As one surveys the policy arena, questions are raised
about free trade by those who worry about Japan (and today
this includes many more than the "revisionists") and who argue that free trade with Japan is not gainful. Several environmentalists as well oppose free trade with passion. These
concerns relate to what now is called the absence of "level
playing fields": "fair trade" as a precondition of free trade is
the battle cry.
There is also the fear that free trade, even if efficient,
hurts the unskilled and thus immiserizes the proletariat:
Marx (who predicted such immiserization unsuccessfully)
may be striking again. Indeed, this concern with distributive
justice resonates most with the intriguing title of this conference: the Morality of Protectionism.
Paul Samuelson, my old teacher at MIT and the celebrated Nobel laureate in Economics, recalls being asked by
the mathematician Stan Ulam which proposition in economics is both true and counterintuitive? He scratched his head
for a while and then came up with the law of comparative
advantage. Thus, even if I can do both Economics and Law
better than you, I should not do both like Marx's complete
man. Instead, I should specialize in Economics, leaving Law
to you, since my superiority in Economics is comparatively
greater than my superiority in Law. That way, we get better
Economics and better Law. The implied division of labor is
* Author's note: This essay is adapted from a keynote address
delivered at the Symposium on The Morality of Protectionism at the Ncw
York University School of Law on October 2, 1992. 1 have developed the
ideas here in greater depth, for economists, in the 1993 Harry Johnson
Lecture to the Royal Economic Society, delivered at the Society's Annual
Conference in York, England. TheJohnson Lecture will be published in
the Economicjoumal (forthcoming March 1994).
** Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics and Political Science, Columbia University, and Economic Policy Advisor to the Director-Gencral.
GATT, 1991-1993.
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at the heart of the case for free trade. Free trade is essentially a policy that sets incentives for domestic production
and trade so as to fully exploit such comparative advantage.
This fundamental intuition of Economics has never been
plausible to the general public. Indeed, those of us who are
wedded to free trade are destined to sleep poorly. What I
propose to do today is to discuss how free trade has been
challenged through the two centuries since its virtues were
extolled by Adam Smith, and then discuss the modem challenges which I noted at the outset.
The earlier, conventional challenges essentially reflect a
dissonance between the assumptions that underlie the case
for free trade and the reality that one allegedly confronts.
The modem, new challenges go outside the framework
within which the case for free trade has been developed.
We economists must confront these new challenges
head on, to argue afresh that the old case for free trade survives intellectually, instead of asserting its truth by resort to
conventional argumentation. The latter is a familiar trap.
Another Paul Samuelson anecdote illustrates well its danger.
Asked how often Economics changes, he remarked: One funeral at a time!
I.

THE OLD CHALLENGES

The case for free trade is dependent on the assumption
that market prices reflect social costs. Hence the challenges
to the doctrine of free trade over the last two centuries have
come from theorists who focused on one market imperfection or another. The attendant market failure implies that
market prices no longer equal social costs, requiring that the
Invisible Hand, now frail and inadequate, be assisted. Hence
free trade can be improved by intervention.
Thus, starting from the earliest theoretical arguments in
the first half of the nineteenth century for infant industry
protection and for a tariff to exploit a country's monopoly
power in trade,' down to the postwar period when during
the 1950s through 1970s economists of my generation anal. For the key historical references to these arguments, seeJouN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (London, Longman, Greene,
and Co. 1848), and ROBERT TORRENS, THE BUDGET: ON COMMERCIAL AND

COLONIAL POLICY (London, Smith, Elder 1844).
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lyzedfactor market imperfections, and on to the 1980s when
our students analyzed product market imperfections, the theorists of commercial policy have continued to reexamine the
essential case for free trade and to design appropriate policy
intervention in light of the market failure at hand.
It is fair to say that the theoretical arguments for infant
industry protection and a tariff to exploit monopoly power in
trade remained the only serious intellectual challenges to
free trade through the nineteenth century and the early
twentieth century.
The first new argument against free trade thereafter,
and the most influential for policy, came with the onset of
the Great Depression. In a 1951 lecture to the Manchester
Statistical Society, John Hicks recounted how the unemployment of those years had seriously undermined the belief in
the doctrine of free trade:
The main thing which caused so much liberal opinion in England to lose its faith in free trade was the
helplessness of the older liberalism in the face of
massive unemployment, and the possibility of using
import restriction as an element in an active programme fighting unemployment. One is, of course,
obliged to associate this line of thought with the
name of Keynes. It was this, almost alone, which
led Keynes to abandon his early belief in Free
2
Trade.
Keynes's apostasy on free trade had been suggested in A
Treatise on Money3 and in his testimony before the MacMillan
Committee in February 1930, where he offered the view that
tariffs, while unwise as a long-term policy, could immediately
alleviate the slump. 4 Interestingly, Keynes seems to have anticipated the later objection that the superior intervention to
achieve full employment was domestic reflation rather than
expenditure-switching protection.
Later theoretical analysis would then show how, under
fixed exchange rates, reflation would cause external imbalance and therefore two policies, reflation and devaluation,
2.

JOHN HiCms, ESSAYS IN WORLD ECONOMics 48 (1959).
3. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY (1930).
4. For a more detailed analysis, see my 1993 Harry Johnson Lecture.
supra note 1.
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would be necessary to attain the two targets of external and
internal balance. Tariffs would then appear to be inferior to
the optimal combination of devaluation and reflation as the
policy solution to unemployment.
But these insights came later. During the 1930s,
Keynes's renunciation of the doctrine of free trade remained
a potent source of disbelief in the doctrine. Combined with
the massive unemployment unleashed by the Great Depression and the lingering aftermath of its distress, this apostasy
turned the 1930s into the most deadly episode among the
challenges to the doctrine of free trade.
The 1930s also witnessed the emergence of a threat to
free trade from an altogether different direction. It came,
not from economic circumstance driving revisionism, but entirely from autonomous theoretical progress: and that too in
a curiously tangential way.
As the 1920s ended, the economists Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson independently came up with important theoretical analyses of imperfect competition, opening
up to systematic exploration the middle ground between
perfect competition and pure monopoly. The result was to
undermine seriously the notion that market prices reflected
social costs, calling into question the virtue of laissez-faire
broadly, and, more narrowly, the merit of free trade.
The economists of the Chicago school correctly saw this
as a threat that would legitimate interventionism. Accordingly, they proceeded to counter the threat by utilizing
econometrics to demonstrate that, although markets seemed
imperfect to the naked eye, in reality there was "as if" or
"working" competition and that the imperfections were not
of enough consequence to require policy intervention. Today, we talk not of "as if" competition but of "contestable
markets": but, by and large, the key thought is the same.
Despite Chicago's riposte, however, the skepticism about
prices not reflecting social costs due to imperfect competition remained a potent source of erosion in the belief that
free trade was a desirable policy.
The damage that the theory of imperfect competition
did to the policy of free trade, however, cannot be argued to
have been serious for two reasons. To begin with, the attack
on free trade was of the nihilistic variety, hard to tap by spe-
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cific interest groups. Besides, free trade was already imperilled far more seriously by Keynes's desertion, by the economic circumstance of massive unemployment, and by the
new macroeconomic ideas that I have discussed. When
economists returned to imperfect competition in the 1980s,
the threat would become more serious: economic circumstance would have changed, with more compelling craving
for protection by a number of oligopolistic industries. The
idiom and substance of the new work on imperfect competition would be ripe for exploitation and capture by protectionist interests.
Let me then turn immediately to the postwar period.
The 1950s through 1970s were decades of increasingly freer
trade in the developed countries. Successive GATT rounds
brought tariffs down to low levels. Trade expansion and income growth interacted to make this era a Golden Age with
which the later, more troubled years in the 1970s would contrast unhappily. In this respect, this was again the heyday of
free trade.
Increasing trade liberalization of the developed countries, however, contrasted with the turn to import substitution and protectionist policies in much of the underdeveloped world. The newly-independent developing countries
were determined to use the "infant industry" argument

freely to support nascent industries. Equally, they considered these industries to be necessary features of a modern
economy and society, implying what international economists in the 1960s would call a "non-economic" preference.
Besides, it was widely believed that the developing countries
were characterized by a number of market imperfections, the
principal ones being in factor markets: distorting intersectoral wage differentials, sticky wages such that the market
wage exceeded the shadow wage, sector-specific minimum
wages, and monopsony. All these implied market failure
which would seem to require protection.
Interestingly, therefore, since trade theory often responds to reality, the major developments in the theory of
commercial policy during this period came not from the developed country liberalization (though the growth of the European Common Market did stimulate the new theory of customs and preferential trade liberalization), but rather from
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the developing countries' concerns and policies of protection.
The theory of optimal policy intervention in the presence of non-economic objectives was fuelled by these concerns. Moreover, there was an explosion of theoretical developments concerning the optimal, and second-best, policies to remedy the distorting effects of several different
factor market imperfections.
These developments, however, led to a most important
twist in favor of free trade. Instead of underlining the need
for protection to fix these market failures, these analyses led
to the conclusion that the best way to address domestic distortions 5 (such as most factor market imperfections) was
through domestic policy interventions, 6 and that in these
cases protection was a second-best measure.
The net effect of this central insight was to narrow, not
widen, the case for protection, since until then it was commonly believed that protection was the appropriate way to
handle all kinds of market failure. Protection was seen to be
the first-best policy only when the distortion was foreign, not
domestic.
This insight applied equally to the important question of
non-economic objectives. Symmetrically, the trade theorists
showed that only when the non-economic objective was in
the foreign sector (e.g., one wanted to reduce imports in the
pursuit of "self-sufficiency"), the optimal intervention would
be in the shape of protection; in other cases, it required domestic policy intervention.
Thus, the 1960s through 1970s were characterized by
contrasting phenomena:
(i) a substantial threat to free trade from the demands
for protection from the many developing countries which, in
fact, embraced extensive protection as part of their developmental strategy of import substitution; and a reduced threat
to 'free trade from the developed countries which pursued
trade liberalization instead; and
(ii) a substantial concern with market failure (in factor
5. i.e., market failure occurring in domestic markets: e.g., labor market failure.
6. i.e., interventions directly in the domestic market where the failure
occurred.
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markets) and non-economic objectives, both stemming from
developing country concerns, which implied increased legitimacy for intervention and presumably therefore for trade
protection; and a strengthening of the theoretical case for
free trade because theoretical analysis, stimulated by these
questions, showed that the appropriate intervention required was mostly in domestic markets, not in the form of
trade protection.
The 1980s shared with the 1950s-1970s the distinction
of having the theory of imperfect competition applied to the
free trade debate. But whereas the earlier period was concerned with factor market imperfections, the latter period was
concerned with product market imperfections.
In turn, this reflected a shift from a preoccupation with
protectionism in the developing countries to a preoccupation
with protectionism in the developed countries. In fact, by the
end of the 1970s, the combination of economic writings and
extensive research into the costs of import substitution and
the benefits of export promotion, and the example provided
by the successful export-promoting nations of the Far East,
had led to growing trade liberalization among the developing countries.
By contrast, the developed countries had lapsed into
resorting to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in lieu of the reduced
tariffs "bound" at the GATT. In fact, the rise of NTBs in the
shape of Voluntary Export Restraints and "administered
protection" in the shape of the unfair use of fair trade mechanisms such as anti-dumping actions and countervailing duties, got quite out of hand in both the EC and in the United
States, beginning in the early 1980s.
The growth of protectionist outcomes reflected increases in both the "demand for," and the "supply of" protection. The demand for protection had escalated to unmanageable levels owing to the Volcker-led recession. In addition, the United States suffered from serious dollar
overvaluation during the first Reagan administration. The
United States was also succumbing to a return of the "diminished giant syndrome." 7
Intense competition among the firms of the developed
7. See Jagdish N. Bhagwvati and Douglas A. Irwin, The Relurn of the
Reciprocitarians: U.S. Trade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109 (1987).
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countries, and the desire to protect against inroads by foreign rivals, provided the context within which the theoretical
developments, analyzing the interventionist implications of
the large-group model of imperfect competition, and more
pointedly of the small-group oligopolistic models, were set.
They caught the protectionist fancy, met the protectionist
needs, and therefore immediately took center stage of the
public policy debate.
From the protectionist viewpoint, therefore, the imperfect competition models of the 1950s through 1970s were
popular in the developing countries as legitimating (to the
uncritical eye) their protectionism. The imperfect competition models of the 1980s were equally popular in the developed countries as legitimating (to the uncritical eye) their
protectionism.
As for policy, the theorists of imperfect competition in
product markets themselves have returned to the fold of free
trade in one of two ways:
(i) they have followed the "Chicago school" approach
of saying that the market imperfections do not amount to a
hill of beans and should therefore be ignored by policymakers. This is the view embraced in varying degrees by economists, such as Gene Grossman, who argue, for instance, that
rent-shifting towards oneself by using trade policy in oligopolistic industries, scientifically shown to be a good policy
intervention, requires that there be significant rents to shift,
but that arguably there are few such rents in reality;8 or
(ii) they have followed the more conservative "public
choice" school approach which essentially argues that the
visible hand will strangulate: intervention will produce
worse outcomes than the imperfect markets that we seek to
fix. This can happen if you have a predatory view of government, which should not be surprising. But it comes from the
public choice view that special interest lobbying will distort
the outcome. The economist Paul Krugman has taken this
view. 9
8. Gene M. Grossman, Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique, in STRATEGic TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcs 47 (Paul R.
Krugman ed., 1986).
9. Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?,J.ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at
131.
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I should add however that the theoretical developments
in the 1980s were not one-sided. The case for free trade was
strengthened indirectly by the new interest in political-economy theoretic modelling that has by now become a compelling trend in economic theorizing more generally. In particular, the notion that the cost of protection was low and
therefore unworthy of policy attention simply because the
deadweight (i.e., efficiency) losses measured conventionally
by economists were a small fraction of the national income,
was seen as naive when the induced rent-seeking was taken
into account.' 0 The general theory of DUP (directly unproductive profit-seeking) activities, developed in the last decade, now considers alternative ways in which resource-using
but zero-output-producing (and income-earning) activities
can result from lobbying for policy change to redistribute income towards oneself (as with tariffs), or through lobbying
to share in the rents or revenues from existing policies (as
when lobbies compete for rent-fetching import quotas already in place). I I Such DUP activities could add significantly
to the deadweight cost of protection.
Thus the 1980s began by marrying the rising protectionist demand in the developed countries to the theoretical developments in the theory of imperfect competition in product markets. Protectionism did break out, making the period
one of high threat to free trade. It ended, however, with the
proponents of the theory backing off into free trade, and
with the new developments in the political-economy theory
of DUP and rent-seeking activities strengthening the case
against protection.
II.

THE NEW CHALLENGES

New challenges have arisen, as I noted at the outset,
proving the adage that a free trader's life will not suffer from
the ennui that follows success. Demands for fair trade and
harmonization of domestic policies and institutions in trading nations as preconditions for free trade have multiplied.
Equally, there is widespread concern that trade liberalization
10. Anne. 0. Krueger, The PoliticalEconomy of the Reni-seeking Society. 64
Am. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
11. Jagdish N. Bhag-wati, Directly-unproductive Profit-seekng DI 'P) Actlvities, 90J. POL. ECON. 998 (1982).
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with the poor countries will impoverish the workers of the
rich countries: a fear articulated eloquently by Ross Perot
and Pat Choate in their denunciation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico as "a drastic and unfair
scheme" that "will pit American and Mexican workers in a
2
race to the bottom."'
A.

Fair Trade as a Preconditionfor Free Trade

The demands for partial or total harmonization of domestic policies, such as environmental and labor standards,
and domestic institutions, such as retail distribution systems
and technology policies, have grown recently for a variety of
reasons, even though a trade economist would normally consider diversity among trading nations to be good, rather than
3
bad, for mutually-gainful trade.'
Perhaps the most potent reason is that protectionist demands are more likely to meet with approval if, instead of
saying that you need help because you cannot compete, you
claim that the foreigner is gaining because of his resort to
unfair trade. The enormous use of even conventional fair
trade mechanisms in the 1980s, such as the levying of antidumping and countervailing duties (designed to offset foreign subsidies), is to be explained, not in terms of a genuine
rise in the phenomena of predatory dumping and foreign
subsidization, but as the capture of these mechanisms for
protectionist purposes. Ironically, these fair trade institutions have been used unfairly to get protection rather than to
maintain free trade.
In my view, however, a major contributory factor has
been the globalization of the world economy and the fact
that today, with the shares of trade to GNP having risen virtually everywhere in the last two decades, a great number of
activities are now subject to international competition. Then
12. Ross PEROT WITH PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED Now! (1993).
13. Of course, harmonizing "standards" is not the same as harmonizing tastes or endowments. The latter will reduce gains from trade by reducing the diversity that produces trade. But getting another country to,
say, adopt a minimum wage similar to one's own may increase one's gains
from trade by increasing its demand for one's exports at given terms of
trade.
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again, among the OECD countries there has been considerable convergence of technical knowhow, partly brought about
by the global activities of multinationals, so that more industries than ever before are "footloose." The number of industries that are "shiftable" due to someone else gaining a
small new advantage has increased substantially.
The result is kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, where one
day I have comparative advantage in textiles and you in
shoes, tomorrow it may be the other way around, and then
back again: a sort of musical chairs. Two consequences follow, each relevant to one of the two new challenges to free
trade that I have distinguished.
First, in this threatening new world, producers will become very sensitive to the possibility that their foreign competitors are deriving their lethal competitive edge because of
some "unfair" advantage that they "should not" have. Each
will be looking over the others' shoulders to see if some domestic institution or policy is yielding such an unfair advantage. The fact that they do not have the same environmental
regulations, that they do not have to meet the same safety
standards, are among the most common complaints today in
the countries which have stiffer standards, these being generally the OECD countries.
As the NAFTA "supplemental" agreements on these
questions suggest, and since President Salinas of Mexico
eventually agreed to raising the minimum wage in Mexico, it
is only a short step, if not a slippery slope, to then asking that
wages be raised in the poor countries if free trade is to be
permitted with them: the infamous "pauper-labor" argument against free trade would be resurrected.
The second consequence is that the volatility of comparative advantage will lead to greater labor turnover and hence
could impede the acquisition of skills on thejob, thus flattening the growth curve of earnings for labor. A rolling stone
gathers no moss and a moving worker gains no skills.' 4 We
may then have here a rather novel reason why trade may im14. SeeJagdish N. Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia, Freer Trade and Wages
of the Unskilled: Is Marx Striking Again? (paper prepared for the Work-

shop on Trade and Wages at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with the NYUJournal of ntmiattlonalLaw
and Politics).
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pact adversely on wages, contributing to the second new
challenge to free trade that I consider below.
Returning to the question of fair trade, however, it is
evident that the belief that harmonization of domestic policies and institutions is generally essential to free trade is
based on the erroneous notion that, without such harmonization, trade will cease to be a mutual-gain phenomenon and
will instead lead to predation. Economic analysis can readily
confirm that this is a false notion, in general. Diversity of
domestic policies, institutions, and standards is generally
compatible with gainful free trade.
Nonetheless, the popular assumption and demand today
are that if your rival abroad has lower environmental and labor standards, that amounts to "social dumping" in your
market and therefore you should be permitted to impose
countervailing import duties. This notion, gaining ground
in the EC and the United States, is based on obvious fallacies
which fail to understand the following two propositions:
(i) the differences in standards in the same industries as
between countries will reflect legitimately different priorities
among nations in their objectives (as when Mexico may prefer to use its budget on prevention of pollution of a lake by
chemicals from paper mills rather than to reduce CO 2 emissions from lead-containing fuel, whereas the United States
prefers it the other way around); and
(ii) the same general standards, such as taxing of C0 2
emissions, will generally produce non-neutral effects on
comparative advantage (whereas focus on cross-national
within-same-industry comparisons of environmental regulations and such "burdens" focuses mistakenly on absolute advantage).
Besides, it is evident that this *approach opens a Pandora's box. Once it is admitted, despite lack of economic
logic, that cost differences due to differential domestic policies can be countervailed, even if it is originally in the context of "good" causes such as the protection of the environment and labor, it becomes an invitation for protectionists to
cite a plethora of other reasons for imposing countervailing
duties. This tendency is already manifest in the United
States in regard to the highly competitive trade with Japan,
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as well as the NAFTA negotiations. 15
B.

Trade and Wages

The other, equally potent, challenge to free trade comes
from the fear of the income-distributional effects of trade
with the South. Indeed, it is curious that there has been a
reversal of attitudes among the countries of the North and of
the South when trade between them is appraised. During
the 1950s and 1960s, much of the South regarded trade with
the North as a threat, not as an opportunity. Afraid that
without protection they could not industrialize, the countries
of the South turned to import substitution just as the countries of the North were opening to trade through extensive
liberalization. Today, starting in the late 1980s, there have
been fearful voices in the North, dreading trade with the
poor South as a recipe for descent into the wages and working conditions of these impoverished nations, whereas many
in the South now see trade with the North as an opportunity,
not a peril. The contrast between the reaction of the U.S.
Congress and its counterpart in Mexico to NAFTA is a stark
example of this role reversal.
Interestingly, the major theoretical construct which, implicitly or explicitly, has provided the intellectual support
and lent the air of plausibility to the fears in the North of
immiserization of the unskilled from freer trade with the
South has been the celebrated Factor Price Equalization
(FPE) theorem. This theorem shows the adverse impact of

free trade on the factor of production that is scarce in the
country relative to the country's trading partners, i.e., unskilled labor in the North vis-a-vis unskilled labor in the
South, relative to other factors of production such as capital.

It is interesting, of course, that when Paul Samuelson
wrote his famous pair of articles on the FPE theorem in The

EconomicJournal,1 6 the theorem was considered at first to be
implausible and hence possibly wrong, and then to be little

15. The full range of analytical issues raised by the demands for harmonization of domestic policies and institutions is addressed in a number
of papers being written under a Ford Foundation-financed project on Fair
Trade Claims and Gains from Trade, directed by Professor Robert Hudec
of the University of Minnesota Law School and myself.
16. Paul A. Samuelson, International Trade and the Equaluation of Factor
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more than a theoretical curiosity. At the same time, when
Wassily Leontief came up with his startling finding that the
United States was exporting labor-intensive exports, the
search for explanations primarily focused on the reasons the
FPE theorem would not hold in the real world because one or
more of the sufficiency conditions were unrealistic. In short,
the approach to the FPE theorem was not that it defined reality; rather it was that the theorem provided the researcher
with the necessary clues as to why it did not.
By contrast, the tendency today is to regard FPE as an
inescapable destiny, with the (unskilled) proletariat facing an
inevitable immiserization or, at minimum, a heavy drag on
the rise of its real wages. But it is time to remind ourselves
that the original view of the FPE theorem was correct: its
assumptions are indeed extraordinarily demanding. It is not
therefore a compelling, or adequate, guide to real-world
phenomena.
Consider, in particular, just a few reasons why the presumption that real wages in the North will fall in convergence to the real wages in the South as a result of free trade
can be considered unrealistic.
(1) Scale economies can cause every productive factor's
real wages to rise. The reason is obvious: the redistributive
effect which militates against the real wage of unskilled labor
can be outweighed by the lifting-all-boats effect of scale
economies on the marginal products and hence real wages of
both factors.
The first theoretical demonstration of this phenomenon
was by Panagariya who modelled scale economies in the old
way where they were external to the firm but internal to the
industry, thus retaining our ability to work with models of
perfect competition.1 7 Helpman and Krugman established
the same conclusion in the context of scale economies internal to the firm, and hence under imperfect competition.
Their analysis was, however, restricted to the special case
where the output per firm did not rise with trade so that the
added gains from trade were due to variety rather than rePrices, 58 ECON. J. 163 (1948); Samuelson, InternationalFactor-PriceEqualisation Once Again, 59 ECON. J. 181 (1949).
17. Arvind Panagariya, Variable Returns to Scale in GeneralEquilibrium Theory OnceAgain, 10J. INT'L ECON. 499 (1980).
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duced cost thanks to scale.' 8 Brown, Deardorff, and Stern
have now produced a more general and illuminating analysis
allowing for both these (and other) effects. 19
(2) The lifting-all-boats effect can also arise if trade
means more competition and discipline, causing efficiency
effects. Again, this means that all factors can get their real
wages improved. The econometric evidence of this hypothesis is hard to find. However, the economist Jim Levinsohn's
recent work on the imports-as-competition hypothesis is successful in testing that hypothesis with the use of Turkish in20
dustrial data under near-controlled-experiment conditions.
Thus, the heavy hand of the FPE theorem can be lifted:
freer trade with the poor countries of the South does not
have to impoverish our unskilled. In fact, the general consensus that seems to be building now among the labor and
trade economists studying the 1980s experience of wages of
the unskilled is that trade is not a significant cause of the phenomenon, and that the true culprit is technology and technical change. The new information technology is reinforcing
Zvi Griliches's original view that skilled labor is relatively
more complementary to capital: a computer can displace
several unskilled workers and create ajob for one skilled operator. 2 1 The impact of both sources of growth, capital accumulation and technical change, can then be to reduce, not
increase, the real wage of the unskilled.
Nonetheless, the fear of freer trade with the South will
continue to pose a challenge that will have to be met with
careful theoretical and empirical arguments that admit the
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19. Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, Protection and Real Wages: Old and New Trade Theories and Their Empirical
Counterparts (May 27-28, 1993)(paper presented at the CEPR/CESPRI
conference on new trade theories, Bocconi University, Milan. on file with

the NYU Journal of InternationalLaw and Politics). The computed effect of
NAFTA on the real wages of US unskilled labor, when embodying scale
economies, showed them to rise, not fall.
20. James Levinsohn, Testing the imports-as-market-disaplinehypothests. 35
J. INT'L ECON. 1 (1993).
21. Zvi Griliches, Capital-Skill Complemrenarity, 51 REv. EcoN. STAT. 465
(1969). Also see the evidence in Alan Krueger, How Computers Hare
Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence from Microdata. 1984-1989, 108 Q. J.
ECON. 33 (1993).
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fear to be reasonable, given the decline in real wages of the
unskilled during the 1980s, while allaying that fear by an objective analysis that shows the fear to be unjustified.
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